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1 Introduction
The European Commission has initiated a number of policy proposals di-
rected at aﬀecting the distribution of ownership and control in European
companies.1 A common trend in these initiatives is to promote the so-called
“principle of proportionality”, which states that it is desirable to have pro-
portional distributions of cash flow and control rights among investors in
publicly listed corporations. According to the principle of proportionality
it is undesirable to use instruments - such as dual class shares, pyramidal
ownership structures, cross ownership, golden shares and voting caps - that
create a wedge between the nominal income rights and the voting rights
that the ultimate owners of a public corporation possess. In this paper we
scrutinize the foundation for this principle in a sample of over 4,000 publicly
traded corporations from 14 Western European countries.
Ownership concentration provides two eﬀects on the governance of cor-
porations: An incentive eﬀect which makes the monitoring of management
more eﬃcient and an entrenchment eﬀect which makes it easier for oppor-
tunistic owners to behave in a manner that enriches themselves at the cost
of other owners. In general corporations with proportional ownership struc-
tures seem to create more value than firms in which ownership of control
is more concentrated than ownership of cash flow (Claessens, Djankov, Fan
and Lang 2002, Cronqvist and Nilsson 2003). Thus, the present evidence
1The EU Action Plan on ’Modernizing Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Gov-
ernance in the EU’ from 2003 suggests prohibiting the listing of “abusive” pyramids on
the stock exchange and to ”examine the consequences of an approach aiming at achieving
a full shareholder democracy (one share - one vote)”. Backed by the recommendations of
the Final Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts (Winter et al. 2002),
the Commission previously proposed the so-called Break-Through rule allowing owners of
75 pct. or more of the cash flow rights in a corporation to exercise control even if they
possess less than 50 pct. of the votes. This proposal was later removed due to political
obstacles.
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suggests that corporations wishing to maximize firm value should obey the
“principle of proportionality”.
We confirm the negative impact of disproportional ownership structures
on firm value in our large sample of European firms. In addition we take
the analysis two important steps forward: The first is to separate the eﬀect
of diﬀerent instruments to create disproportional ownership structures. In
particular, it is shown that creating disproportional ownership structures
through the use of dual class shares destroys more value than creating dis-
proportional ownership structures through pyramids, which again destroys
significantly more value than cross ownership and other instruments. Hence,
we show that it is not disproportionality as such that destroys firm value;
rather the reduction in value comes from the particular instrument used to
create a wedge between ownership and control.
The second step is to document that the impact of diﬀerent instruments
depends on the level of legal protection of outside investors. Theoretically,
better investor protection provides stronger incentives for managers to work
in the interest of the owners, even in the absence of large controlling own-
ers, since the market for corporate control is active and transparent. On the
other hand, if investor protection is low, managers may feel little outside
pressure and therefore may tend to slack more if they are not monitored
closely by large controlling owners. Similarly, the controlling owners’ en-
trenchment opportunities may also be lower in countries with good investor
protection.
We interact our measures of disproportional ownership structures with
measures of legal investor protection taken from La Porta et.al. (1998).
It is shown that the value discount of disproportional ownership generally
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increases with the level of investor protection and that this eﬀect in particu-
lar is very significant for dual class shares and pyramids. For countries with
inadequate investor protection, we find no significant impact of these instru-
ments, hence, we provide evidence that disproportional ownership structures
and legal investor protection substitute governance mechanisms from the
perspective of outside investors.
The results of the present paper have important policy implications for
the harmonization of EU company laws. Disproportionality decreases firm
value and in particular disproportionality created through the use of dual
class shares. Thus, on the one hand, this may provide arguments in fa-
vor of policy proposals and regulative initiatives that promote the principle
of proportionality and make it less attractive to choose dual class shares,
pyramids and other instruments. On the other hand, it is also shown that
the desirability of such proposals varies significantly across countries and in
particular depends on the degree of investor protection on the national level.
While limiting the use of dual class shares and pyramids can increase firm
value in Northern Europe, this is unlikely to be true for firms in Southern
European countries, where these instruments can function as a substitute
for investor protection. Our analysis, therefore, supports the view that cur-
rently one size does not fit all countries with respect to the harmonization of
corporate laws and that high investor protection is a prerequisite for a strin-
gent implementation of the principle of proportionality within the European
Union.
The paper proceeds as follows: In the next section we present our sam-
ple of Western European firms and discuss the data. Section 3 provides
a picture of the distribution of ownership and the use of disproportional-
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ity instruments in Europe. Section 4 presents the results of our analysis:
First, we confirm the negative relationship between disproportional own-
ership structures and firm value in Western European firms. Second, we
disentangle the source of this negative relationship by separating the eﬀects
of the instruments that created the disproportionality. Third, we analyze
the connection between disproportionality and investor protection and show
that the negative impact of disproportional ownership structure is stronger
in countries with good investor protection. Fourth, we analyze the impact
of disproportionality on earnings performance. Section 5 anlyses the robust-
ness of our results. Finally, section 6 discusses the policy implications of our
findings both with respect to creating an internal capital market within the
EU and with respect to national codes and principles for good corporate
governance.
1.1 Related literature
There are a number of studies that have analyzed the impact of dispropor-
tional ownership structures on firm value and performance. Claessens et al.
(2002) identify empirically the incentive and entrenchment eﬀects of large
shareholders. In a sample of 1,301 publicly traded corporations in eight East
Asian countries, they show that ownership concentration in itself increases
firm value, but that a separation of cash flow and control decreases firm
value. They also try to measure the importance of the instruments sepa-
rating ownership and control rights to shed light on which mechanisms that
are driving the results. However, their sample is dominated by pyramidal
ownership in Asian business groups and they are therefore not able to disen-
tangle which disproportionality instrument is associated with the valuation
discount. Lins (2003) investigates firm performance and managerial owner-
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ship in 1000+ corporations in 18 emerging markets and finds that firm value
is reduced whenever votes are more concentrated than cash flow. Gompers,
Ishii and Metrick (2004) analyze a sample of US firms with dual class shares
and show that the relationship of firm value to managerial ownership con-
centration measured with cash flow is positive and concave, whereas the
relationship to voting concentration is negative and convex. Hence, these
findings are very similar to the Claessens et al. study of Asian firms. Con-
sistent evidence is provided by Gompers et al. where sales growth, capital
expenditures and R&D spending are regressed on managerial ownership.
Entrenched managers underinvest, whereas managers with high cash flow
rights pursue more aggressive investment strategies. Cronqvist and Nilsson
(2003) analyze the impact of controlling minority shareholders on firm value
and firm performance in a sample of 309 publicly traded Swedish firms.
They show that having controlling minority owners, i.e. a disproportional
ownership structure, decreases firm value and performance, an eﬀect that is
most significant when these controlling minority shareholders are families.
In a sample of 174 Finnish firms Maury and Pajuste (2004) document that
firm value decreases if large owners control firms through disproportional
ownership structures.
These papers all provide evidence that the concentration of ownership
and control is associated with both incentive and entrenchment eﬀects. This
insight is confirmed currently in a sample of 4,000+ Western European pub-
licly traded firms. Since European capital markets are diﬀerent from capital
markets in emerging countries and in the US (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes
and Shleifer 1999), the finding that there are incentives and entrenchment
eﬀects in a large sample of European firms is important in itself. How-
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ever, compared to the above studies, the main contribution of this paper
is to separate the eﬀect of disproportionality by types of instruments, i.e.
to investigate if instruments such as dual class shares, pyramids and cross
ownership provide the same impact on firm value, and by analyzing whether
legal investor protection matters for these results.
There is a vast literature on ownership concentration and firm valuation
and performance. Following Demsetz and Lehn (1985), a number of studies
have found no significant relationship between ownership and performance,
whereas a second group of studies initiated with Morck, Shleifer and Vishny
(1988) have found a non-linear relationship as the combined outcome of
incentive and entrenchment eﬀects. This study has little to say about own-
ership concentration as such, our focus is instead on the instruments behind
the separation of ownership and control.
The consequences of disproportional ownership structures have further-
more been documented through estimating the voting premium on shares
with superior voting rights (See e.g. Zingales 1994, 1995, Nenova 2003 and
references herein). This premium has been read as a measure of private ben-
efits of control. Interestingly, this measure seems to be higher in countries
with low investor protection and the lowest in countries with good investor
protection. Hence, the ability to extract private benefit may be limited
when investor protection is good. This is one part of the general argument
described above. With respect to firm value, we argue that dual class shares
may also increase the value of better monitoring incentives. We show that
the aggregate eﬀect on firm value of dual class shares is negatively related
to investor protection.
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2 Data
Our data are obtained from two diﬀerent sources. The data on owner-
ship structure and firm organization are primarily obtained from Faccio and
Lang’s (2002) study of firms in Western Europe. We have extended their
data set with firms in Denmark and Sweden.2 Danish firms were not in-
cluded in Faccio and Lang’s study, whereas we were able to extend the
number of Swedish firms from 245 to 335 implying that we have ownership
information on 5,521 Western European firms. All ownership variables are
defined according to Faccio and Lang (2002).
These data on ownership structure and firm organization are merged
with accounting data from Worldscope from 1996 to 1998. We use the
name of the firm as the identifier between the two data sets. Matching
firm names produced a number of obstacles due to shortcomings in the data
sources. To reduce the number of missing firms, we checked for changes
in firm name and de-listings. Further, not all listed firms in Europe are
included in Worldscope - in particular firms in Spain and Belgium, where
only 170 out of 604 listed Spanish firms and 94 out of 130 Belgian firms are
included. The total number of firms is reduced from 5,521 to 4,410 mainly
due to firms missing in Worldscope and, to a smaller extent, to shortcomings
in the matching procedure and deviations between Faccio and Lang’s data
and Worldscope.
Our analysis seeks to examine the eﬀects of disproportional ownership
structures on firm value, measured by Tobin’s Q, where we use the standard
definition that Q equals market value of equity plus book value of debt over
2The ownership structures of Danish and Swedish firms are obtained from Greens and
SIS A¨garservice, respectively.
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book value of assets. A potential problem with this measure of Q arises
for firms with dual class shares. The superior voting shares can be either
publicly or privately held. Firm value is calculated on the basis of the
publicly traded shares and therefore assumes that the price of the superior
voting shares equals the price of the limited voting shares for those firms with
privately held superior voting shares. We thereby assume that the superior
voting shares (SVS) carry zero voting premium. Obviously this assumption
might provide a bias that, in theory, can drive the valuation results, since
firms with dual class shares might be valued incorrectly. We show that
this possibility is inconsistent with the literature on voting premia: Value
of control is decreasing in the level of investor protection (Nenova 2003),
whereas it is shown that the negative impact of disproportional ownership
structure on firm value is increasing in investor protection.
In the regressions we control for a wide range of firm characteristics
that are likely to aﬀect firm performance (see Table 1 for a definition of
the explanatory variables). To control for size eﬀects, we include sales. We
include leverage to control for firms in financial distress, while both asset
tangibility and sales growth capture that growth firms have higher market-
to-book ratios. Finally, we control for the largest owners’ cash flow stake.
Unfortunately, not all firms in Worldscope report all of the control variables;
we therefore exclude 314 firms where either market value, sales, sales growth
or asset tangibility are missing. We further exclude 5 firms with assets under
1 million dollars and 4 firms with extreme sales growth. Thus, the empirical
analysis is carried out with 4,096 observations.3
3We are missing adequate information on the return on assets for 46 of the 4,096
firms. Thus, in Section 4.5, where we analyze the link between disproportional ownership
structures and earnings performance, the number of observations is reduced to 4,050.
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The merged sample is a representative sub sample of Faccio and Lang’s
data with respect to the employment of disproportionality instruments. Ta-
ble 2 provides summary statistics on country and regional levels. Average
Tobin’s Q on the country level increases with the degree of investor protec-
tion, which is consistent with evidence from La Porta et.al. (2002).
3 The pattern of disproportional ownership struc-
tures in Western European firms
Table 3, which depicts the use of instruments to separate cash flow and
control in Western Europe, shows the share of firms with dual class shares,
pyramidal ownership, cross ownership and other instruments. The last group
is defined as the residual group. These firms have disproportional ownership
structures that do not belong to the three former groups, e.g. they have
either restriction on voting rights (voting caps) or some form of government
control through golden shares.
The frequency of these four groups diﬀers across countries. Dual class
shares are widely used in Denmark, Finland, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland
and, surprisingly, the United Kingdom, whereas they are absent in Belgium,
Portugal and Spain and almost absent in France. Pyramids are frequently
used in all European countries, but are less pronounced in Finland and
Switzerland. Cross-holdings are rare and only present in Austria, Germany,
Italy, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom.4
Apart from the diﬀerences in the frequency of these instruments as laid
out in Table 3, the legal definition of each instrument varies from country
4Overall, we find a higher fraction of firms that use instruments to concentrate control
in countries with high investor protection (Scandinavia, Ireland and the UK) than in
countries with poor investor protection (Central and Southern Europe). However, as we
show in the next section, the use of these instruments diﬀers significantly between Anglo-
Saxon countries and Continental Europe.
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to country. Dual class shares can be issued without any restrictions in
Austria, Ireland and Switzerland, whereas a one-share-one-vote ownership
structure is required in Belgium and, in principle, Norway.5 A majority of
the other European countries have a cap on the proportion of the non-voting
shares that can be issued. Limited voting shares (LVS) are not allowed
to exceed threshold levels of 50 pct. of the nominal capital in Germany,
Italy, Portugal and Spain, and 25 pct. in France. Denmark, Finland and
Sweden have imposed a maximum voting ratio of 10 to 1 between SVS
and LVS (with potential ”grandfather”-clauses that provide exemptions for
older firms with diﬀerent voting ratios when the rules where implemented),
whereas non-voting shares have been outlawed in the UK since 1968.
The underlying restrictions and variation in the corporate law among
European countries are reflected in the data. In Germany, firms with dual
class shares often assign no voting power to the limited voting shares; thus,
the LVS is reduced to a claim on future income rights.6 Similarly, in Den-
mark and Sweden, a 10:1 voting ratio between SLVs and LVSs is the most
common, since it is applied by almost all firms with dual class shares in
both countries.7 In France, the firms with dual class shares are primarily
privatized state-owned enterprises.
Figure 1 illustrates the importance of the combined eﬀect of the preva-
lence of instruments and the distribution of ownership by showing the dis-
tribution of cash flow and votes for the European firms in our gross sample
of 4,410 firms. To save space, we group the firms into four regions according
to their legal origin (see La Porta et al. 1998) and focus on the ownership
5Departures from the one-share-one-vote principle in Norway require government ap-
proval. Our data show that these exceptions are granted frequently.
6Becht and Bo¨hmer (2001)
7Bennedsen and Nielsen (2004)
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of the largest owner.8
The firms that obey the proportionality principle are located on the 45-
degree line, which we denote the “proportionality line” in Figure 1. In all
countries, except Sweden, these constitute a majority of all firms.9 The two
trend lines illustrate the average degree of disproportionality as a function
of the cash flow of the largest owner, and from these, it is evident that
ownership structures in the two Anglo-Saxon countries generally are more
proportional than in Continental Europe. In Continental Europe, dispro-
portionality instruments are used to concentrate control in the hands of
the largest owners, whereas in the UK and Ireland, the typical ownership
structure has a more even distribution of ownership and control even in the
presence of these instruments.10 Interestingly, in Scandinaivia there is even
a few firm located underneeth the proportionality line. In these firms the
largest owner possesses more cash flow than votes because the SVS only
account for a trivial fraction (less than 5 pct.) of the total nominal capital.
8From Figure 1 and a similar - unreported - figure for the group of largest owners, note
that most firms in all countries have some form of concentrated ownership. In most firms,
the group of large owners possesses more than 20 percent of both cash flow and votes.
This is consistent with evidence in Barca and Becht (2001), Gugler (2002) and Faccio and
Lang (2002)
9The distribution of the point mass in Figure 1 becomes important when we interpret
our empirical results in Sections 4 and 5. Figure 1 can further be used to illustrate the two
measures of disproportionality we apply in the econometric analysis below. The absolute
disproportionality is defined as votes minus cash flow (in percent) and the relative dispro-
portionality, which equals votes over cash flow. In the figure absolute disproportionality is
the vertical distance from a firm to the proportionality line. Similarly, the relative dispro-
portionality measure is given by the slope on the line from the origin through the plot of
votes against cash flow. Absolute disproportionality is smallest in the UK and Southern
European countries and much larger in Scandinavian and German legal origin countries.
10The insights in Figure 1 are confirmed in the unreported numbers for mean and median
ownership stakes. The mean (median) of the largest owner’s cash flow stake in the UK
is 18 pct. (14 pct.), whereas the mean (median) of the largest owner’s cash flow stake in
continental Europe is: 25 pct. (21 pct.) in Scandinavia, 43 pct. (40 pct.) in the German
legal origin countries and 40 pct. (40 pct.) in Southern Europe. Similarly, the mean
(median) of the largest owner’s control stake in the UK is 20 pct. (16 pct.) compared to
33 pct. (30 pct.) in Scandinavia, 50 pct. (50 pct.) in German legal origin countries and
44 pct. (46 pct.) in Southern Europe.
13
4 Results
4.1 Simple means
Before we present the results of our regression analysis, we can illuminate
the main contributions of this paper by looking at the simple means of firm
value and earnings performance across ownership structures and legal origin.
These are presented in Table 4.
The first part of the table yields the average and median firm value
(Tobin’s Q) and earnings performance (RoA) on the European level for all
firms, firms that obey the principle of proportionality, use dual class shares
and have a pyramidal ownership structure, respectively.
The first observation is that firms with proportional ownership on av-
erage have a higher firm value than firms with a disproportional ownership
structure. For the whole sample, the mean (median) Tobin’s Q for firms
with proportional ownership structure is 1.36 (0.92), which is higher than
the mean (median) for firms that have a disproportional ownership structure
which yields 1.17 (0.88).11
The second insight from Table 4 is that firms using dual class shares have
a significantly lower firm value than firms with a proportional ownership
structure. Firms organized through corporate pyramids have a higher mean
firm value than firms with dual class shares, but still have a significantly
lower firm value than firms with a proportional ownership structure.
The third insight is that the value discount of disproportional owner-
ship structures and instruments to separate ownership from control diﬀers
across regions in Europe. Following La Porta et al. (1998) we divide our
11This diﬀerence is highly significant, but to save space, significance levels are left out
in this subsection, since they will be confirmed in the regression analysis that follows.
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sample into four regions: the UK & Ireland; the Scandinavian countries
(Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden); Southern European countries
(Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain), and countries inspired by the
German legal system (Germany, Austria and Switzerland). According to
La Porta et al. (1998), these four regions represent diﬀerent legal systems,
with outside owners in the UK and Ireland being best protected, followed by
outside owners in Scandinavia. Outside owners in Southern Europe are less
protected than in Scandinavia but generally slightly better protected than
outside owners in countries with a German legal origin. Table 4 yields that
the discount on firm value of disproportionality is economically higher in
the two Northern European regions than in the two Continental European
regions, which is consistent with the hypothesis that the cost of dispropor-
tional ownership structures correlates positively with the degree of investor
protection.
Finally, Table 4 also indicates that there does not seem to be any ob-
servable earnings performance diﬀerences (measured by return on assets)
between firms with proportional ownership structures and firms with dis-
proportional ownership structures in either Northern or Southern Europe.
The rest of this section will provide more rigorous evidence in support
of these observations.
4.2 The cost of disproportionality
We estimate a cross sectional model of the average of the three yearly obser-
vations from 1996 to 1998. This is done because Faccio and Lang’s data on
the ownership structure in each country are not collected in the same year
for all countries. Thus, we assume that the ownership structure is constant
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for the period 1996 to 1998 and focus on the variation between firms.12 We
include country specific ’fixed’ eﬀects to control for country specific firm
invariant heterogeneity. This is important if our basic model omits country
specific variables, that are correlated with the explanatory variables such as
the level of protection of outside investors.13
Table 5 analyzes the relationship between ownership concentration, dis-
proportionality and firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q. In the left side, we
focus on the largest owner’s ownership share, whereas in the right side, we
use the ownership stakes of the whole group of large owners.14 In this and
all other models, we control for size, leverage (debt-to-assets ratio), asset
tangibility, sales growth and industry eﬀects.
In the sample of firms across Western Europe, there appears to be a
negative, but highly insignificant eﬀect of ownership concentration on firm
value and firm performance. Hence, on the aggregate level, we cannot con-
clude any significant linear relationship between firm value and ownership
concentration. Claessens et al. find a positive and significant eﬀect of own-
ership concentration in their sample of Asian firms. Obviously, our result
does not exclude that there could be a significant non-linear relationship, as
documented by Morck et al. (1988). However, since the literature on these
questions is extensive, they will not be further pursued here.
In Model 2 of Table 5, a dummy variable is included for whether a given
firm has a proportional ownership structure, which is defined as the absence
12For a number of firms we only have one or two yearly observations between 1996 and
1998 of the tangible assets; thus, for those we use the average of the available observations.
We also estimate the cross sectional model based on yearly observations. This has no
impact on the results below.
13La Porta et al. (1999) show that the level of investor protection explains country
variation in ownership and capital structures.
14We define the group of large owners as the joint ownership of all owners who possess
more than 10 percent of the votes.
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of separating instruments and an equal distribution of cash flow and votes.
In both specifications this proportionality dummy is positive and significant
at the 5 percent level. Hence, a proportional ownership structure is generally
seen to increase firm value in publicly traded Western European firms. The
eﬀect is economically large: On average, firms with proportional ownership
structures have a 15 pct. higher firm value than firms with disproportional
ownership structure. This is consistent with the evidence for Asian firms
provided by Claessens et al., who show that firm value decreases to the extent
that ownership is separated from control. The simple regression model used
here has satisfactory explanatory power, with an adjusted R2 of around 14
pct.
Models 3 and 4 look at the degree of disproportionality. Absolute dis-
proportionality is significant both when we look at the single largest owner
and the group of large owners. Again, the marginal eﬀects are large. A
10 pct. increase in the wedge between cash flow and control of the largest
owner decreases firm value with 3.2 pct. on average, and 2.0 pct. for a
similar increase for the group of largest owners. If we instead use relative
disproportionality we notice that the negative impact only is significant in
the case where we analyze the group of large owners. Hence, this analysis
shows that investors look at whether firms have proportional ownership or
not, and in the latter case, at the actual degree of disproportionality.
We conclude that our aggregate analysis provide evidence in support of
the principle of proportionality since firms with an one-to-one relationship
between cash flow and votes indeed seem to have higher valuation relative to
firms with disproportional ownership structures. This result raises at least
two interesting policy relevant questions: 1) Does it matter how firms create
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disproportionality and, 2) Are the eﬀects shaped by the legal environment
a firm operates in. These questions are addressed next.
4.3 Instrument analysis: Dual class shares, pyramids and
cross-ownership.
There are many ways a firm can disobey the principle of proportionality:
Through the use of dual class shares where the SVSs are possessed by a
small group of controlling owners; a chain of corporate ownership (pyra-
mids) concentrating control in the hands of a few ultimate owners; a cross
ownership between a pair of corporations; or, voting caps implying that
none of the owners can have more than a few percent of the votes. In this
section, we analyze how the value discount from disproportional ownership
structures depends on which of these instruments is used.
There are a number of theoretical contributions that analyze dual class
shares. In publicly traded firms with an active market for corporate con-
trol, most models have focused on the impact on control fights of having
disproportional ownership structures through the use of dual class shares
(see Grosmann and Hart 1988, Harris and Raviv 1988, a.o.). In closely held
firms, Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) show that having a one-share-one-
vote rule increases incentives to collaborate with other owners, which may
increase firm value.
A priori there is no reason to expect that diﬀerent disproportionality
mechanisms work through the same channels. When dual class shares are
used, the ultimate owners have a direct contact with a given firm. On the
other hand, if chains of corporate ownership are used, the agents represent-
ing the ultimate owners may have diﬀerent constituencies, perhaps reflecting
compromises between conflicting interests on a higher level of the pyramid.
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There are few theoretical studies of pyramidal ownership. The main ex-
ception is Almeida and Wolfenzon (2004), who analyze the dual question
as to why pyramids arise and what determines the structure of a pyramid.
Since pyramids are created to extract private benefits for the group of con-
trolling owners, non-controlling owners should require a discount to invest
in such firms. Hence, according to their argument, it would be expected
that pyramids have lower firm value than firms with proportional ownership
structures.
Table 6 provides evidence of the impact of diﬀerent disproportionality
instruments on firm value. Model 5 explains firm value (Tobin’s Q) as a
function of the particular instrument used to create disproportionality and
our standard control variables. Notice that the impact of the presence of
dual class shares on firm value is negative, large and significant at the 1
percent level. The eﬀect is economically large: The firm value of an average
European firm with dual class shares is approximately 20 pct. smaller than
the average firm with a proportional ownership structure. In Models 6 and
7, we look at the interaction eﬀects of dual class shares and the degree of
disproportionality on firm value. Given that firms have dual class shares, the
degree of disproportionality has a significant negative impact on firm value
when we use the absolute disproportionality measure. However, the negative
impact of the interaction of dual class shares and relative disproportionality
is insignificant.
Thus, we have confirmed that dual class shares, on average, seem to
destroy firm value in the European firms in our sample. This is consistent
with the argument that dual class shares entrench owners since they possess
significant control without internalizing suﬃciently cash flow. These results
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suggest that the capital market reacts negatively to this wedge between
ownership and control by discounting the value of the firm.
Similar to the value discount of dual class shares, pyramids have a neg-
ative and statistically significant eﬀect on firm value in our sample. The
estimated coeﬃcients are smaller than those for dual class shares; however,
the economic consequences are still large. On average, the firm value of
the average European firm with a pyramidal ownership structure is around
8 percent lower than for the average European firm with a proportional
ownership structure. The interaction eﬀects between the two measures of
disproportionality and pyramidal structure are generally insignificant.
Dual class shares and pyramids, thus, seem to have a diﬀerent impact on
firm value. Using an F-test, we strongly reject the null hypothesis that the
eﬀect of dual class shares and pyramids are identical. Hence, the two coef-
ficients are both economically and statistically diﬀerent: Dual class shares
have a significantly stronger negative eﬀect on firm value than pyramids.
Cross-holdings have a positive eﬀect on firm value, which is significant
at the 10 percent level. Even though the impact is much less statistically
clear than for the two previous instruments, there are some indications that
cross holding, on average, may increase firm value. The interaction eﬀects
between cross-holdings and the two measures of disproportionality vary in
signs and are highly insignificant. Finally, the impact of other instruments
is in most regressions highly insignificant, as are the interaction eﬀects be-
tween other instruments and the two disproportionality measures. Notice,
however, that firms with cross holdings and other instruments are few in
number as documented in Table 3.
If we analyze the group of large owners, these results do not change. The
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economic and statistical impact of dual class shares and pyramids are very
similar to the analysis of the single largest owner. Again we reject the null
hypothesis that the two instruments have the same impact at the 1 percent
level. The eﬀect of cross holdings is still positive and significant at the 10
percent level. Other instruments have an insignificant eﬀect.
In summary, this section shows that the type of instrument through
which disproportionality is created is indeed important for the eﬀect of dis-
proportionality on firm value. Dual class shares and pyramids have a large
negative impact on firm value. In addition, dual class shares have a sig-
nificantly larger negative eﬀect on firm value than pyramids. This insight
delivers important policy implications, which we will return to in the final
section below.
4.4 Investor protection and the cost of disproportionality
Currently, there are a large number of studies analyzing the impact of in-
vestor protection on various topics within corporate finance and firm orga-
nization (see survey by La Porta et.al. 2000). In this section, we investigate
whether investor protection also plays a role in explaining the impact of
disproportionality instruments on firm value.
As motivation for this analysis, consider the costs and benefits of dual
class shares. The principal benefit is that they reduce the opportunistic
behavior of the management in firms with a significant separation of owner-
ship and control. The main cost is the increased opportunities for controlling
shareholders to extract rent from non-controlling shareholders.
Good investor protection reduces, ceteris paribus, the management’s
ability to engage in opportunistic behavior contrary to the interests of the
owners, but it also reduces the controlling owners’ ability to extract rent
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from non-controlling owners.15 However, even in firms where non-controlling
shareholders are well protected, there will always be a legal scope for control-
ling shareholders to expropriate rent for themselves, for instance, through
pecuniary and/or non-pecuniary benefits or by influencing business decisions
in a way that promotes their own interests. We conclude that since both the
costs and benefits of dual class shares are aﬀected by the degree of investor
protection, it is not possible to theoretically determine the exact aggregate
impact on the value discount of dual class shares.
We use the two standard measures of investor protection from La Porta
et al. (1998); anti-director and creditor rights. The anti-director rights in-
dex summarizes 6 specific decision rights granted to minority shareholders
by corporate law, whereas the creditor right index measures the presence
of 5 protective rights granted to creditors in case of bankruptcy. The in-
dices increase with the level of legal investor protection and they are pos-
itively correlated. In the analysis of ownership structures and firm value,
the interaction of anti-director rights with the disproportionality measures
is expected a priori to be most important.
In Table 7, the two measures of investor protection are interacted with
the degree of disproportionality.16 To simplify the presentation of the results
we do not report the control variables and industry eﬀect, which are identical
to the ones used throughout the analysis. We start by including the interac-
tion of anti-director rights with the proportionality dummy. The interaction
eﬀect is positive and highly significant, whereas the proportionality dummy
15This is most evident in transition economies, where insiders’ insuﬃcient ability to
commit not to divert outsiders’ investments has been a serious obstacle for increased
foreign investment (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).
16Note that our basic regression model includes a fixed country eﬀect and therefore
already controls for the direct eﬀect of the level of legal investor protection, since it is
constant within each country.
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becomes negative and marginally insignificant. Thus, the eﬀect of propor-
tional ownership structures increases with the level of investor protection,
but is insignificant in countries with low levels of investor protection. A sim-
ple F-test of the net eﬀect of a proportional ownership structure reveals that
the positive eﬀect kicks in when the anti-director rights score is 3 or higher,
whereas the eﬀect is insignificant for scores below 3.17 Similar results are ob-
tained when using the creditor rights index, but Model 2(c) shows that this
is mainly due to the positive correlation between anti-director and creditor
rights. When both terms are included, only the interaction with the anti-
director index is significant. Furthermore, these results are robust towards
the measure of disproportionality, since identical results are obtained when
investor protection indices are interacted with the absolute degree of dis-
proportionality. The negative eﬀect of disproportional ownership structures
increases with the level of investor protection, but the eﬀect is only present
for countries with a relatively high level of investor protection. For countries
with a high level of investor protection (the UK, Ireland and Scandinavia),
the negative eﬀect of disproportional ownership structures are economically
important; firms with a disproportional ownership structure and an anti-
director rights score of 5 have a 20 percent lower firm value than firms with
a proportional ownership structure.
Table 8 extends the analysis of the eﬀect of disproportionality into the
use of particular instruments.18 We start by including the interaction of
the two investor protection indices with the four groups of instruments in
Models 5(a) and (b). At the top of Table 8, we notice that the direct eﬀect of
17The F-test of the net eﬀect of proportional ownership structures with an anti-director
rights score of 2 yields a F-statistic of 0.61, which is grossly insignificant, whereas the
F-value when the score equals 3 is 7.20, which is significant at the 1 percent level.
18Again, control variables are not reported in Table 8.
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dual class shares and pyramids disappear. All instruments enter positively,
but the eﬀects are highly insignificant. The interaction of dual class shares
and anti-director rights is negative and significant at the 1 percent level.
Similarly, the negative eﬀect of pyramids on firm value increases with the
level of investor protection. The net eﬀect of dual class shares is negative
and significant for investor protection scores at 2 or above, whereas the
net eﬀect of pyramids becomes significantly negative when the score is 3 or
higher. The estimate of the coeﬃcient on the interaction eﬀect of dual class
shares is almost twice as large as the estimate of the coeﬃcient on pyramids.
We use an F-test to test whether the net impact of dual class shares and
pyramids is statistically diﬀerent. We find that the negative eﬀect of dual
class shares is significantly higher than the eﬀect of pyramids in countries
with a high level of investor protection.19 Model 5(c) confirms the insight
from Table 7 that the anti-director rights index is the relevant measure
for the interaction of the level of investor protection and disproportional
ownership structures.
The residual group of firms with cross ownership and other dispropor-
tionality measures does not seem to have a strong negative impact on firm
value, since the net eﬀect in Table 8 is grossly insignificant. As mentioned
previously, there are few firms and many diﬀerent instruments in these resid-
ual groups; hence, we will not put to much emphasize on these results except
from noticing that they are consistent with the main hypothesis about in-
vestor protection and disproportionality instruments being substitutes.
Our analysis provides evidence that proportional ownership structures
19The F-test of a diﬀerent net eﬀect for dual class shares and pyramids yields an F-value
of 1.23 with an anti-director rights score of 2, whereas the F-value equals 4.12 when the
score equals 3, which is significant at the 5 percent level. Increasing the level of investor
protection expands this diﬀerence further both statistically and economically.
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increase firm value only in countries where the degree of legal investor pro-
tection is high. Hence, the results show that investor protection and dispro-
portional ownership structures are substitutes. If inadequate protection of
outside investors exists, the benefits of disproportional ownership structures,
i.e. the reduced agency problem between owners and managers, outweighs
the costs, i.e. the increased agency problem between controlling and non-
controlling owners. If investor protection, on the other hand, is strong, then
there seems to be fewer benefits from violating the principle of proportion-
ality and investors therefore require a larger discount on such firms. This
finding has important policy implications for the harmonization of Euro-
pean company laws, since countries in Northern Europe (the UK, Ireland
and Scandinavia) generally have a higher level of investor protection than
countries in Central and Southern Europe (See Table 2 and La Porta et al.
1998).
To substantiate this important aspect of our findings, we further divided
our 14 countries into four regions.
In support of the evidence reported above, the negative eﬀect of dispro-
portional ownership structures is significant in the UK, Ireland and Scandi-
navia, whereas it is insignificant in Southern European countries and coun-
tries with a German legal system.20 This pattern holds for all measures of
disproportionality and for the decomposition into the instruments that cre-
ated this disproportionality. Consistently, we also find that dual class shares
have a significantly larger negative eﬀect on firm value in Northern Europe.
To conclude this section, we emphasize that regional and cross-country
variations are important. Dual class shares and pyramids destroy firm value
20To save space we have decided not to report these results, but they are available upon
request.
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in Northern Europe, but not necessarily so in the Central and Southern
European regions where investor protection traditionally is lower. This sup-
ports the argument that dual class shares and pyramids (and possibly also
other disproportionality instruments) substitute good investor protection in
countries with low protection of outside investors. Again, we will postpone
the discussion of the policy implications of these findings to Section 5.
4.5 The impact of disproportionality instruments on earn-
ings performance
The analysis has so far focused on the impact of disproportionality on firm
value. Table 9 shows the impact of the various measures of disproportional-
ity on earnings performance. In general the eﬀect of disproportional owner-
ship structures disappears when we use return on assets as our endogenous
variable. While the eﬀects are close to zero and highly insignificant, it is
important to note that the performance models based on RoA have very
little explanatory power. The R2 is only around 3 percent, compared to R2
of around 14 percent. in our firm value analysis.
Table 10 repeats the analysis where the eﬀects of diﬀerent instruments
are separated by using earnings performance as the endogenous variable. In
general, the eﬀects, which are very clear when we use Tobin’s Q as endoge-
nous variable become highly insignificant in these models. Thus, we cannot
provide any evidence of dual class shares or pyramids having a significant
negative impact on earnings performance in the Western European corpo-
rations. We now discuss a number of potential arguments explaining these
findings.
First, as mentioned above, this could be due to the two types of mod-
els having diﬀerent levels of quality. In general, the explanatory power of
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the firm value models is higher than in the performance models. However,
the explanatory power in the earnings performance models varies a great
deal, and even in the best models we do not find any significant eﬀects of
disproportionality or its instruments.
Second, a possible hypothesis could be that the value eﬀects are driven
by a systematic valuation bias due to that we misrepresent the ’true’ value of
the controlling ownership blocks. We have calculated Tobin’s Q on the basis
of the stock price from trades of minority holdings. Thus, if the controlling
blocks are traded at a premium, this method implies a negative bias on the
total market value of the firm. Our results cannot be driven by this potential
valuation bias due to the following reasons:
First, if the results were driven by this valuation bias, then we should
expect the same eﬀect for any given concentration of control. However, we
showed above that the diﬀerent mechanisms gave statistically diﬀerent ef-
fects on firm value. In particular, both at the European level and at the
disaggregated level for countries with high investor protection, dual class
shares have a statistically larger negative impact on firm value than pyra-
midal ownership structures.
Second, when firms have dual class shares, a voting premium is gener-
ally attached to the superior voting shares. Even in Western Europe the
voting premium can be rather substantial; Nenova (2003) finds that the
median voting premium varies widely from 30 percent in Italy to 0 percent
in Denmark. Table 11 shows the voting premium in the 9 Western Euro-
pean countries included in Nenova’s study. Table 11 indicates a negative
correlation between the voting premium and the value discount of dual class
shares. For example, we find the strongest negative eﬀect of dual class shares
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in Scandinavia where the average voting premium is zero. If the valuation
bias were driving this result, a positive correlation would exist between value
discounts and voting premia. Hence, we reject that our results are driven
by this valuation bias.
Finally, it may be true that disproportionality instruments generally do
not aﬀect the earnings performance of firms even though they aﬀect valua-
tion. This could be the case if controlling owners extract a disproportional
part of the surplus in the firms they control after operations have been car-
ried out. In this case, all owners will have an interest in profit maximization,
implying that we should observe no earnings performance eﬀect of violating
the principle of proportionality. However, potential outside investors will
still require a discount for investing in the firm, hence, implying that we
should expect a negative eﬀect on firm value.
5 Robustness
This section summarizes a number of robustness checks to the preceding
analysis. All the results are, as shown, robust to the definition of the con-
trolling owner. On the left side of Tables 5 through 10, we have reported the
results using the cash flow and votes of the largest owner, whereas on the
right side we have used the cash flows and votes of the group of large owners
(i.e. the joint ownership of all owners who possess more than 10 percent
of the votes). Similarly, we have run all regressions using the cross-section
data from 1996, 1997 and 1998 individually rather than the average of the
period from 1996 to 1998. None of the results reported are aﬀected by our
choice of sample period. Finally, we have run regressions where we have
excluded firms in Belgium, Portugal and Spain in the analysis of the link
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between disproportionality and firm performance. This was done because
the empirical analysis relates the performance of a particular firm to the
mean of the industry within the country, thus the results are likely to suﬀer
from selection bias if the data only cover a small fraction of the total number
of listed firms, which lead us to the exclude firms in Spain. This is particu-
larly a problem if the total number of listed firms is small, which leads us to
exclude firms incorporated in Belgium and Portugal. The number of firms
is thereby reduced to 3,741. Again, none of the results change when firms
incorporated in Belgium, Portugal and Spain are excluded. As mentioned
above we have further divided the sample into the four regions based on
legal origin to ascertain that our results are not driven by the large number
of UK firms.
6 Policy implications
The “principle of proportionality” states that it is desirable to have propor-
tional distributions of cash flow and control rights among the investors in
publicly listed corporations.
We have shown three important results related to this principle. First,
it has been confirmed that publicly traded corporations in Western Europe
that obey this principle on average have a higher firm value than corpora-
tions violating this principle. Second, this discount on firm value depends
on which disproportionality instrument is used; in particular, there is signif-
icantly more value reduction when using dual class shares than pyramids,
whereas we find no evidence of a value reduction from other instruments.
Third, disproportional ownership structures substitute investor protection,
implying that such structures are more costly in countries with a high pro-
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tection of outside investors where agency problems generally are perceived
to be smaller.
These findings shed new light on some recent policy issues in relation-
ship to the creation of a common internal capital market in the European
Union. During the last two decades the European Commission has worked
on reforming company laws within the EU. Inspired by the Final Report of
the High Level Group of Company Law Experts (Winter et al. 2002), the
promotion of the principle of proportionality has been a recurrent theme
in this harmonization process. The EU Commission views this process as
an essential part of exploiting the benefits of the internal market and as
a prerequisite for the integration of European capital markets. The Win-
ter Report suggested the introduction of the much debated Break-Through
rule to facilitate takeovers of firms with a disproportional ownership struc-
ture.21 The recent EU Action Plan (2003) proposes that within the next
four years “abusive” pyramids shall be prohibited from being listed on a
stock exchange. Abusive pyramids are defined as holding companies whose
sole or main assets are their ownership of shares in another listed company.
More generally, there is an increasing focus on shareholder rights and the
potential conflicts between controlling and non-controlling groups of owners.
We claim that this increased focus on shareholder rights and (some ver-
sion of) the principle of proportionality are making not only an impact on
policy proposals from the European Commissions, but more generally in-
21The Break-Through rule states that an investor, after acquiring a certain threshold
of the cash flow rights to a firm, should be able to break through the firm’s current control
structure. The Winter Report suggests that the threshold should be set at 75 percent,
so that any owner possessing 75 percent of the total outstanding shares, independently of
the presence of dual class shares, should have complete control of the firm. The proposal
was included in the initial version of the proposal for a new takeover directive, but was
removed in the final version (See European Commission 2002, 2003)
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fluence the attitude towards corporate governance in many countries both
inside and outside the European Union. To back this claim we have collected
53 codes, principles and guidelines on good corporate governance22 and an-
alyzed to what extent they provide discussions and/or recommendations of
issues concerning the distribution of cash flow and votes in corporations.
Table 12 provides a summary of these findings. A total of 38 codes out of
53 deal with the conflict of interests between controlling shareholders and
minority shareholders. Out of these 19 codes directly consider and/or com-
ment on the discrepancy between cash flow rights and voting rights. Eleven
codes either recommend that firms follow a one-share-one-vote principle or
recommend more generally an alignment between control and ownership.
Eight codes explicitly recommend not having dual class shares or comment
specifically on the negative eﬀects of having diﬀerent voting rights attached
to shares. Ten codes either emphasize that pyramidal ownership structures
shall be disclosed and transparent or directly warn against the use of pyra-
mids. Similarly, 11 codes propose that voting caps either should be disclosed
by firms or avoided. Finally, seven codes recommend that shareholder agree-
ments should be disclosed.
Many of the codes we have collected are from countries outside Europe;
however, the tendency towards more focus on the principle of proportionality
and shareholder rights is also clear within the 13 countries from our sample
for which a code of conduct was found. Nine of these country codes deal
with the potential conflict between controlling and non-controlling owners.
22Our selection procedure is simple: We collected all codes published on the web site
of the European Corporate Governance Institute (www.ecgi.org) by January 1, 2005. For
each country we picked one code or principle. If a country had more than one code, we
selected the most “oﬃcial” looking code. We excluded Japan and South Africa due to a
lack of access and Ireland due to its focus on remuneration only. In addition we included
a few codes from international institutions.
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Six out of these countries comment on the discrepancy between ownership
and control. Austria, Denmark and Germany go one step further and rec-
ommend an alignment between control and cash flow rights. Germany even
recommends not using dual class shares. Spain and Switzerland propose
that firms should publish relevant information about pyramidal ownership
structures. Voting caps should be avoided according to the German code
and declared according to the Danish code. Interestingly, there is almost
no discussion of proportionality between ownership and control in the most
recent UK code from July 2003.
Given that the principle of proportionality plays such a significant role
either directly or indirectly both in the process of creating an internal capital
market within Europe and in the way that individual European countries
think about corporate governance, it is natural to ask whether the results
of this paper support these initiatives and recommendations. The answer is
mixed:
First, it was shown that having a proportional ownership structure in-
creases firm value, but not earnings performance in the total sample, which
to some extent supports the principle of proportionality. However, we have
found significant regional diﬀerences, which are correlated with the level of
investor protection. Hence, even though a principle of proportionality can
increase firm value in Northern Europe, it is not clear that this proposal
would increase firm value in the rest of Europe without additional regula-
tory initiatives. More generally, our findings support the idea that one size
does not fit all countries, i.e. that individual variation in investor protection
may be an important factor determining the consequences of implementing
a principle of proportionality.
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Second, our findings indicate that it may be more relevant to focus on
the various instruments that create disproportional ownership structures.
Even though theoretically it may be hard to understand the diﬀerence be-
tween dual class shares and pyramids, these two instruments empirically
have a diﬀerent impact on firm valuation. Firms with dual class shares and
a suﬃciently disproportional ownership structure do create less value than
other firms. It is worth emphasizing that these firms would have been af-
fected by the now withdrawn EU proposal regarding the introduction of a
Break-Through rule. Thus, our analysis provides some support for a Break-
Through rule, but with two caveats: policy makers should understand that a
Break-Through rule is likely only to increase firm value (not earnings perfor-
mance) in general and this eﬀect can only be expected in Northern Europe
where investor protection is generally higher.
Third, we find a negative eﬀect on firm value from pyramidal structures
in Northern Europe; however, the value eﬀects from pyramidal structures
are generally smaller than in the case of dual class shares. The EU Action
Plan (2003) suggests that in the medium term abusive pyramids should be
regulated, but does not suggest specific regulation for dual class shares. Un-
fortunately, we have no data on holding companies and, therefore, we cannot
directly analyze the impact of abusive pyramids relative to other types of
disproportional ownership structures. However, the analysis strongly reaf-
firms the need for more knowledge about the consequences of diﬀerent kinds
of pyramids before such policy initiatives are implemented.
Finally, we conclude by repeating the main policy implication of the
analysis. Taking the existing variation in the legal protection of outside
investors as a given, it is expected that there may be significant regional
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variation in the economic consequences of implementing a principle of pro-
portionality. A prerequisite for exploiting the full benefit for all regions
within the European Union is to have a high level of protection of outside
investors. As is currently the case when investor protection varies across
regions, there seems to be some truth to the claim that one size does not fit
all countries with respect to regulative initiatives aimed at promoting the
principle of proportionality.
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 Figure 1, Largest Owner’s Share of Cash Flow and Votes Across Legal Regimes 
These figures plot the largest owner’s share of cash flow and votes across legal regimes in Europe; 
the UK & Ireland, Scandinavia (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), German origin (Austria, 
Germany and Switzerland) and Southern Europe (Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain). 
Above each graph, the total number of firms (N), number of firms with a proportional ownership 
structure (PP), dual class shares (DCS) and other instruments than dual class shares, i.e. pyramid, 
cross-holding and other (PCO) are shown. These three different types of firms are marked with a 
triangle (PP), cross (DCS) and dot (PCO), respectively. All firms with a proportional ownership 
structure (PP) are located on the Proportionality Line, whereas the lines Trend with PP and Trend 
without PP show the coefficient on the regression of votes on cash flow with and without firms with 
a proportional ownership structure (PP), respectively. 
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 Table 1, Explanatory Variables 
Firm size Measured as log. to sales. 
Leverage Book-value of debt over book-value of total assets. 
Asset tangiblity Share of assets that are tangible. Defined as 1 – (intangibles / total assets). 
Sales growth Growth in sales in the year prior to the observation. 
Controlling owner’s cash flow 
stake 
The share of cash flow held by the controlling owner.  
We use two definitions of the controlling owner. On the left side of each 
regression table, the controlling owner is defined as the single largest owner 
measured by votes, whereas on the right side, the controlling owner is 
defined as the group of large owners that individually possess at least 10 
percent of the votes.  
Proportionality A dummy taking the value 1 if the controlling owner has an equal share of 
cash flow and votes, and the firm does not have dual class shares, a 
pyramidal structure or a cross holding structure. 
Dual class shares (DCS) A dummy taking the value 1 if the firm has dual class shares. 
Pyramid (PYR) A dummy taking the value 1 if the firm has a pyramidal ownership structure. 
Cross holding (CRO) A dummy taking the value 1 if the firm has cross holdings. 
Other types of 
disproportionality (OTH) 
A dummy taking the value 1 if the firm has introduced a disproportional 
ownership structure through other instruments than dual class shares, 
pyramid and cross holding. 
Absolute disproportionality The controlling owner’s share of votes minus cash flow.  
The left side of the regression tables are based on the largest owner’s 
holdings, whereas the right side focuses on the group of large owners. 
Relative disproportionality The controlling owner’s share of votes over cash flow. 
The left side of the regression tables are based on the largest owner’s 
holdings, whereas the right side focuses on the group of large owners. 
 
 Table 2, Summary Statistics, Year = 1997 
This table shows the summary statistics on country level for the dependent variables, Tobin’s Q and Return on Assets (RoA), as well as the control variables used throughout the 
empirical section. Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of equity plus book value of debt divided with book value of assets, whereas RoA is defined as operating profit over book value 
of assets. Firm size is measured by sales in millions of dollars. Leverage is defined by book value of debt over book value of assets. Asset tangibility is defined as (1 - book value of 
intangible assets / book value of assets), while sales growth is the growth in sales for the previous year. N reflects the number of observations in the regression models dependent on the 
endogenous variable, Tobin’s Q and RoA. The degree of investor protection is measured by two variables: Anti Director Rights index (ADR) and Creditor Rights index (CR) from La 
Porta et al. (1998). ADR is measured on a scale from 0 to 6, where 0 is the lowest degree and 6 is the highest degree, while CR has a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 5. 
 
Country Tobins Q RoA Firm size Leverage Asset Tangibility Sales Growth N Investor 
Protection 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Tobins Q RoA ADR CR 
Austria 0.87 0.70 0.07 0.03 671 219 0.26 0.23 0.97 0.99 0.30 0.13 90 89 2 3 
Belgium 1.20 0.91 0.08 0.06 1711 245 0.27 0.24 0.95 0.99 0.59 0.14 85 85 0 2 
Denmark 1.10 0.83 0.07 0.05 380 77 0.23 0.20 0.98 1.00 0.20 0.16 164 161 2 3 
Finland 1.29 0.94 0.09 0.08 861 137 0.29 0.27 0.95 0.98 0.38 0.20 105 103 3 1 
France 1.00 0.78 0.04 0.04 2088 214 0.24 0.22 0.91 0.96 0.31 0.13 495 491 3 0 
Germany 1.23 0.85 0.04 0.04 2437 235 0.21 0.17 0.96 0.99 0.28 0.10 582 579 1 3 
Ireland 1.59 1.11 0.04 0.07 572 176 0.23 0.22 0.95 1.00 0.15 0.15 60 58 4 1 
Italy 0.83 0.68 0.04 0.03 2590 442 0.26 0.24 0.96 0.99 0.14 0.12 169 165 1 2 
Norway 1.33 1.01 0.07 0.06 536 132 0.32 0.31 0.96 0.99 0.30 0.12 138 137 4 2 
Portugal 0.78 0.70 0.04 0.04 579 149 0.25 0.24 0.93 0.99 0.20 0.17 70 67 3 1 
Spain 1.08 0.85 0.06 0.05 863 213 0.19 0.16 0.97 0.99 0.51 0.15 146 143 4 2 
Sweden 1.80 1.21 0.04 0.07 965 115 0.23 0.21 0.92 0.97 0.54 0.12 200 198 3 2 
Switzerland 1.05 0.80 0.06 0.05 1996 281 0.26 0.24 0.97 1.00 0.15 0.09 161 160 2 1 
UK 1.47 0.98 0.05 0.06 829 87 0.19 0.16 0.98 1.00 0.20 0.08 1632 1614 5 4 
                 
All countries 1.28 0.90 0.05 0.05 1316 143 0.22 0.19 0.96 1.00 0.26 0.11 4096 4050 2.64 1.93 
 Table 3, Use of Instruments to Create Disproportionality Between Ownership of Cash Flow 
and Votes 
This table summarizes the use of disproportionality instruments on country level across Western Europe. The columns 
show the number and share of firms controlled via different disproportionality instruments in each country. The last two 
columns show the total number and share of firms that use at least one instrument. 
Country N  Dual Class 
Shares 
 Pyramid Cross 
Holding 
Other 
Instruments 
 All 
Instruments 
    N Share N Share N Share N Share N Share 
Austria 90 21 0.23 23 0.26 1 0.01 0 0.00 39 0.43 
Belgium 85 0 0.00 23 0.27 0 0.00 5 0.06 28 0.33 
Denmark 164 48 0.29 28 0.17 0 0.00 9 0.05 75 0.46 
Finland 105 46 0.44 7 0.07 0 0.00 7 0.07 56 0.53 
France 495 15 0.03 72 0.15 0 0.00 0 0.00 86 0.17 
Germany 582 112 0.19 137 0.24 18 0.03 3 0.01 233 0.40 
Ireland 60 15 0.25 11 0.18 0 0.00 2 0.03 25 0.42 
Italy 169 73 0.43 42 0.25 2 0.01 1 0.01 93 0.55 
Norway 138 15 0.11 45 0.33 3 0.02 1 0.01 57 0.41 
Portugal 70 0 0.00 9 0.13 0 0.00 0 0.00 9 0.13 
Spain 146 0 0.00 24 0.16 0 0.00 3 0.02 27 0.18 
Sweden 200 123 0.62 53 0.27 1 0.00 0 0.00 147 0.74 
Switzerland 161 84 0.52 10 0.06 0 0.00 0 0.00 93 0.58 
UK 1632 411 0.25 358 0.22 2 0.00 10 0.01 689 0.42 
            
All countries 4096 963 0.24 842 0.21 27 0.01 41 0.01 1657 0.40 
 
 Table 4, The Impact of Disproportionality Instruments Across Legal Regimes 
This table shows the mean and median Tobin’s Q and RoA for all countries and across legal regimes. 
Statistics are reported for all firms, firms with a proportional ownership structure and firms with dual class 
shares and pyramid. A firm may appear both with dual class shares and pyramid if it has implemented both 
instruments. Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by book value 
of assets, whereas RoA is defined as operating profit over book value of assets. Proportionality is a dummy 
for whether the firm has a proportional ownership structure. 
  N  Tobin’s Q RoA 
  Mean Median Mean Median 
 
All countries 
All 4096 1.28 0.90 0.05 0.05 
Proportionality 2439 1.36 0.92 0.05 0.05 
Dual class shares 963 1.10 0.86 0.05 0.05 
Pyramid 842 1.20 0.90 0.06 0.05 
 
UK & Ireland 
All 1692 1.47 0.98 0.05 0.06 
Proportionality 978 1.68 1.08 0.04 0.07 
Dual class shares 426 1.05 0.87 0.04 0.05 
Pyramid 369 1.25 0.95 0.06 0.06 
 
Scandinavia 
All 606 1.42 0.98 0.06 0.06 
Proportionality 271 1.47 0.96 0.05 0.06 
Dual class shares 232 1.35 1.02 0.08 0.07 
Pyramid 133 1.33 0.93 0.06 0.06 
 
German legal origin  
All 833 1.16 0.83 0.05 0.04 
Proportionality 468 1.21 0.86 0.06 0.04 
Dual class shares 217 1.02 0.73 0.04 0.04 
Pyramid 170 1.15 0.83 0.05 0.04 
 
Southern Europe 
All 965 0.98 0.78 0.05 0.04 
Proportionality 722 0.98 0.78 0.05 0.04 
Dual class shares 88 0.83 0.63 0.04 0.03 
Pyramid 170 1.05 0.82 0.06 0.05 
      
 Table 5, The Effect of Disproportional Ownership Structures on Firm Value in Western Europe  
Estimation on Cross Section Data with Fixed Country Effects, Average of the Period 1996-1998  
This table reports coefficient estimates from the regression including all 14 Western European countries. The data used are the 
averages of the yearly observations in the period 1996-1998. The explanatory variables are described in Table 1 and summary statistics 
are provided in Table 2. The left side of the table reports the results when the controlling owner is assumed to be the largest owner 
measured by votes, whereas the right side assumes that the controlling owner is the group of large owners, which individually holds at 
least 10 percent of the votes. P-values based on robust standard errors are reported in italics. 
Dependent Variable Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
Controlling Owners Largest Owner Group of Large Owners 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Firm size -0.122 -0.118 -0.122 -0.122 -0.122 -0.117 -0.122 -0.122 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Leverage -0.239 -0.243 -0.242 -0.240 -0.239 -0.242 -0.244 -0.239 
  0.106 0.098 0.102 0.105 0.106 0.099 0.100 0.106 
Asset tangibility -1.827 -1.829 -1.816 -1.822 -1.830 -1.836 -1.823 -1.825 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sales growth 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
  0.048 0.036 0.046 0.043 0.047 0.035 0.047 0.033 
Controlling owners’ cash flow stake -0.039 -0.116 -0.070 -0.045 -0.009 -0.051 -0.019 -0.015 
  0.656 0.207 0.433 0.608 0.905 0.516 0.808 0.843 
Proportionality  0.189    0.181   
   0.000    0.000   
Absolute disproportionality   -0.416    -0.254  
    0.046    0.036  
Relative disproportionality    -0.001    -0.003 
    0.200    0.001 
         
Industry effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
         
Adjusted R-squared 0.138 0.141 0.138 0.137 0.138 0.141 0.138 0.138 
N 4096 4096 4096 4096 4096 4096 4096 4096 
   Table 6, The Effect of Disproportionality Instruments on Firm Value in Western Europe 
Estimation on Cross-Section Data with Fixed Country Effects, Average of the Period 1996-1998 
This table reports coefficient estimates from the regression including all 14 Western European countries. The data used 
are the averages of yearly observations in the period 1996-1998. The explanatory variables are described in Table 1 and 
summary statistics are provided in Table 2. The left side of the table reports the results when the controlling owner is 
assumed to be the largest owner measured by votes, whereas the right side assumes that the controlling owner is the 
group of large owners, which individually holds at least 10 percent of the votes. P-values based on robust standard 
errors are reported in italics. 
Dependent Variable Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
Controlling Owners Largest Owner  Group of Large Owners 
  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Firm size -0.116 -0.122 -0.122 -0.116 -0.121 -0.123 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Leverage -0.227 -0.234 -0.233 -0.225 -0.234 -0.237 
  0.122 0.114 0.114 0.124 0.113 0.108 
Asset tangiblity -1.821 -1.811 -1.828 -1.827 -1.818 -1.829 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sales growth 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005 
  0.041 0.050 0.051 0.040 0.048 0.039 
Controlling owners’ cash flow stake -0.106 -0.057 -0.029 -0.054 -0.023 -0.008 
  0.244 0.529 0.740 0.492 0.767 0.916 
Instruments       
      Dual class shares (DCS) -0.259   -0.256   
  0.000   0.000   
      Pyramid (PYR) -0.110   -0.103   
  0.016   0.020   
      Cross holding (CRO) 0.393   0.407   
  0.085   0.074   
      Other types of disproportionality (OTH) -0.213   -0.207   
  0.219   0.235   
Interactions       
      Absolute disproportionality * DCS  -0.621   -0.504  
   0.006   0.003  
      Absolute disproportionality * PYR  -0.011   -0.015  
   0.972   0.923  
      Absolute disproportionality * CRO  -0.351   0.119  
   0.575   0.757  
      Absolute disproportionality * OTH  -0.885   -0.738  
   0.254   0.081  
      Relative disproportionality * DCS   -0.003   -0.001 
    0.180   0.725 
      Relative disproportionality * PYR   0.001   -0.002 
    0.693   0.543 
      Relative disproportionality * CRO   0.004   0.044 
    0.776   0.175 
      Relative disproportionality * OTH   0.105   0.060 
    0.052   0.281 
       
Industry effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
        
Adjusted R-squared 0.143 0.138 0.139 0.143 0.138 0.137 
N 4096 4096 4096 4096 4096 4096 
 Table 7, The Effect of Disproportional Ownership Structures and Investor Protection on Firm 
Value in Western Europe 
Estimation on Cross-Section Data with Fixed Country Effects, Average of the Period 1996-1998 
This table reports coefficient estimates from the regression including all 14 Western European countries. The data used are the 
averages of yearly observations in the period 1996-1998. Proportionality and absolute disproportionality are interacted with 
the anti-director rights and creditor rights indices from La Porta et al. (1998). The control variables include firm size, 
leverage, asset tangibility, sales growth and the controlling owner’s cash flow stake. The explanatory variables are described 
in Table 1. The left side of the table reports the results when the controlling owner is assumed to be the largest owner 
measured by votes, whereas the right side assumes that the controlling owner is the group of large owners, which individually 
holds at least 10 percent of the votes. P-values based on robust standard errors are reported in italics. 
Dependent Variable Tobin's Q 
Controlling Owners Largest Owner 
  Model 2(a) Model 2(b) Model 2(c) Model 3(a) Model 3(b) Model 3(c) 
Proportionality       
Proportionality -0.157 -0.103 -0.234    
  (0.101) (0.222) (0.022)    
Proportionality * Anti-director rights 0.100  0.079    
  (0.000)  (0.008)    
Proportionality * Creditor rights  0.101 0.052    
   0.000 (0.110)    
       
Absolute Disproportionality       
Absolute disproportionality (AD)    1.046 0.647 1.845 
     (0.022) (0.183) (0.001) 
AD * Anti-director rights    -0.643  -0.612 
     (0.000)  (0.000) 
AD * Creditor rights     -0.453 -0.375 
      (0.019) (0.060) 
       
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
        
Industry effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
        
Adjusted R-squared 0.147 0.146 0.147 0.144 0.142 0.144 
N 4096 4096 4096 4096 4096 4096 
 Table 8, The Effect of Disproportional Ownership Structures and Investor Protection on Firm 
Value in Western Europe 
Estimation on Cross-Section Data with Fixed Country Effects, Average of the Period 1996-1998 
This table reports coefficient estimates from the regression including all 14 Western European countries. The data used are the 
averages of yearly observations in the period 1996-1998. The four disproportionality instruments (Dual class shares, pyramid, 
cross holding and other) are interacted with the anti-director rights and creditor rights indices from La Porta et al. (1998). 
The control variables include firm size, leverage, asset tangibility, sales growth and the controlling owner’s cash flow stake. 
The explanatory variables are described in Table 1. The left side of the table reports the results when the controlling owner is 
assumed to be the largest owner measured by votes, whereas the right side assumes that the controlling owner is the group of 
large owners, which individually holds at least 10 percent of the votes. P-values based on robust standard errors are reported 
in italics. 
Dependent Variable Tobin's Q 
Controlling Owners Largest Owner 
  Model 5(a) Model 5(b) Model 5(c) 
Instruments    
      Dual class shares (DCS) 0.080 0.099 0.162 
  (0.420) (0.335) (0.139) 
      Pyramid (PYR) 0.083 0.047 0.125 
  (0.455) (0.627) (0.292) 
      Cross holding (CRO) 0.292 0.098 0.120 
  (0.423) (0.874) (0.826) 
      Other types of disproportionality (OTH) 0.324 0.423 0.608 
 (0.521) (0.399) (0.300) 
Interactions w/ Anti-Director Rights    
DCS * Anti-director rights -0.097  -0.074 
 (0.000)  (0.025) 
PYR * Anti-director rights -0.054  -0.043 
  (0.066)  (0.195) 
CRO * Anti-director rights 0.016  0.007 
 (0.917)  (0.964) 
OTH * Anti-director rights -0.180  -0.141 
 (0.178)  (0.323) 
Interactions w/ Ccreditor Rrights    
DCS * Creditor rights  -0.117 -0.054 
  (0.000) (0.193) 
PYR * Creditor rights  -0.053 -0.027 
  (0.102) (0.460) 
CRO * Creditor rights  0.099 0.071 
  (0.641) (0.728) 
OTH * Creditor rights  -0.240 -0.153 
  (0.095) (0.309) 
    
    
Control variables YES YES YES 
     
Industry effects YES YES YES 
     
Adjusted R-squared 0.148 0.148 0.148 
N 4096 4096 4096 
  Table 9, The Effect of Disproportional Ownership Structures on Earnings Performance in Western Europe  
Estimation on Cross Section Data with Fixed Country Effects, Average of the Period 1996-1998 
This table reports coefficient estimates from the regression including all 14 Western European countries. The data used are the averages of 
yearly observations in the period 1996-1998. The explanatory variables are described in Table 1 and summary statistics are provided in 
Table 2. The left side of the table reports the results when the controlling owner is assumed to be the largest owner measured by votes, 
whereas the right side assumes that the controlling owner is the group of large owners, which individually holds at least 10 percent of the 
votes. P-values based on robust standard errors are reported in italics. 
Dependent Variable Return on Assets Return on Assets 
Controlling Owners Largest Owner  Group of Large Owners 
  Model     I Model    II Model  III Model  IV Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Firm size 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Leverage -0.054 -0.054 -0.054 -0.054 -0.054 -0.054 -0.054 -0.054 
  0.008 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
Asset tangiblity 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165 
  0.037 0.037 0.038 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.036 
Sales growth 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
  0.471 0.465 0.469 0.471 0.471 0.467 0.470 0.471 
Controlling owners’ cash flow stake 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
  0.010 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.299 0.288 0.304 0.314 
Proportionality  -0.003    -0.002   
   0.497    0.711   
Absolute disproportionality   0.013    0.006  
    0.516    0.774  
Relative disproportionality    -3.91E-05    -6.03E-05
     0.441    0.260 
         
Industry effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
          
Adjusted R-squared 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.036 0.036 0.036 
N 4050 4050 4050 4050 4050 4050 4050 4050 
 Table 10, The Effect of Disproportionality Instruments on Earnings Performance in Western 
Europe 
Estimation on Cross Section Data with Fixed Country Effects, Average of the Period 1996-1998 
This table reports coefficients estimates from the regression including all 14 Western European countries. The data used are 
the averages of yearly observations in the period 1996-1998. The explanatory variables are described in Table 1 and 
summary statistics are provided in Table 2. The left side of the table reports the results when the controlling owner is 
assumed to be the largest owner measured by votes, whereas the right side assumes that the controlling owner is the group 
of large owners, which individually holds at least 10 percent of the votes. P-values based on robust standard errors are 
reported in italics. 
Dependent Variable Return on Assets Return on Assets 
Controlling Owners Largest Owner  Group of Large Owners 
  Model   V Model  VI Model VII Model  V Model  VI Model VII 
Firm size 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Leverage -0.053 -0.053 -0.053 -0.053 -0.053 -0.054 
  0.009 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008 
Asset tangiblity 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.166 0.165 0.166 
  0.037 0.037 0.037 0.036 0.037 0.036 
Sales growth 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
  0.462 0.468 0.469 0.464 0.468 0.469 
Controlling owners’ cash flow stake 0.022 0.022 0.020 0.008 0.010 0.019 
  0.014 0.010 0.016 0.373 0.314 0.349 
Instruments       
      Dual class shares (DCS) -0.006   -0.007   
  0.216   0.158   
      Pyramid (PYR) 0.010   0.008   
  0.030   0.057   
      Cross holding (CRO) -0.039   -0.042   
  0.005   0.003   
      Other types of disproportionality (OTH) -0.013   -0.014   
  0.169   0.126   
Interactions       
      Absolute disproportionality * DCS  -0.001   -3.91E-04  
   0.976   0.986  
      Absolute disproportionality * PYR  0.035   0.022  
   0.151   0.366  
      Absolute disproportionality * CRO  -0.272   -0.284  
   0.000   0.000  
      Absolute disproportionality * OTH  -0.070   -0.073  
   0.124   0.106  
      Relative disproportionality * DCS   2.00E-05   5.01E-05 
    0.868   0.670 
      Relative disproportionality * PYR   -3.94E-05   -7.89E-04 
    0.742   0.497 
      Relative disproportionality * CRO   -0.004   -0.004 
    0.001   0.001 
      Relative disproportionality * OTH   -0.002   -0.002 
    0.487   0.448 
       
Industry effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
        
Adjusted R-squared 0.038 0.037 0.037 0.034 0.036 0.036 
N 4050 4050 4050 4050 4050 4050 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 Table 11, Voting Premiums in Western Europe 
This table shows the average and median voting premiums from Nenova’s (2003) study of the relative price of superior 
to limited voting shares. Firms in Austria and Ireland are not included in Nevona’s study and there are no firms with 
dual class shares in Belgium, Portugal and Spain. N is the number of firms where both share classes are listed on the 
stock exchange (number of observations in Nevova’s study), whereas Share of All Firms with Dual Class Shares relates 
this to the total number of firms with dual class shares in our sample.  
 Voting Premium 
 
N Share of All Firms 
with Dual Class Shares 
 Mean Median   
Denmark 0.0084 0.0029 30 0.462 
Finland -0.0503 0.0052 21 0.447 
France 0.2805 0.2747 9 0.600 
Germany 0.0950 0.0493 65 0.556 
Italy 0.2936 0.2993 62 0.838 
Norway 0.0583 0.0438 15 1.000 
Sweden 0.0104 0.0043 43 0.283 
Switzerland 0.0544 0.0147 36 0.404 
United Kingdom 0.0957 0.0721 27 0.066 
 
 Table 12, Survey of Corporate Governance Codes of Conduct 
This table surveys codes of conduct, principles and guidelines for good corporate governance around the world. The codes 
were collected from the European Corporate Governance Institutes website (www.ecgi.org) as of January 1, 2005. We were 
able to collect codes from 48 countries and 5 international organizations (e.g. OECD). One code or principle was chosen for 
each country/international organization. In case a country had more than one code, the most recent and most official code 
was chosen. The countries are divided into three groups: World, European Union and Western Europe, where Western 
Europe corresponds to the 14 countries included in this paper. The number of available codes was 53, 23 and 13, 
respectively. The countries included are listed below the table. The codes from international organizations are only included 
in the ‘World’ category.  
 
Recommendations World 
(N=53)  
 EU 
(N=23) 
 Western Europe 
(N=13) 
 N Share N Share N Share 
 
The Principle of Proportionality 
Discussion of conflicts of interest between 
controlling and minority shareholders  38 0.66 15 0.71 9 0.64 
Discussion of the principle of proportionality 19 0.33 11 0.52 6 0.43 
Recommends one-share-one-vote or an alignment 
between ownership and control 11 0.19 5 0.24 3 0.21 
 
Disproportionality Instruments 
Recommends not using dual class shares or 
disclosing dual class shares 8 0.14 4 0.19 1 0.07 
Recommends not using pyramidal structures or 
disclosing pyramidal structures  10 0.17 4 0.19 2 0.14 
Recommends not using voting caps or disclosing  
voting caps 11 0.19 6 0.29 3 0.21 
Recommends that shareholder agreements should 
be disclosed 7 0.12 3 0.14 1 0.07 
       
 
Countries: Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong 
Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Italy, Kenya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, The Netherlands, The 
Philippines, Turkey, United Kingdom and USA. International organizations: Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance, European Association 
of Securities Dealers, International Corporate Governance Network, Latin America Corporate Governance Roundtable and OECD 
 
